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I Statement of Facts. 
Respondent notes that Appellant Hart does not challenge the use of the judicial 
confirmation process for purposes of obtaining an early resolution of the bond issues 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 6). This should not be construed to mean that Hart agrees with 
the district court's assertion that the confirmation process "allows local governing bodies 
to circumvent the constitutional limitations regarding public indebtedness and lending of 
credit by asking a court to confirm debt rather than obtaining permission from two-thirds 
of its citizens." (Memorandum Decision, R. p. 130) The Judicial Confirmation Act, Title 
VII, Chapter 13 of the Idaho Code merely allows local government entities to apply in a 
summary proceeding for a declaratory judgment as to the validity of their proposed 
bonds. Idaho Code § 7-1308(2) provides that once jurisdiction is established by an 
agency's petition, the "court shall find upon what legal authority the political subdivision 
bases the petition for the proposed bond ... and whether such bond ... is permissible 
under the general laws of the state ... and shall determine if the political subdivision is 
entitled to the relief sought." There is nothing in the Judicial Confirmation law that 
allows local governments to circumvent any constitutional limitations whatsoever. 
Respondent correctly points out that the tax increment revenue is actually paid to 
the Urban Renewal Agency ("agency"; "Agency" is meant to refer to the Rexburg Urban 
Renewal Agency) by the county treasurer. Idaho Code § 50-2908(3). However, 
Respondent incorrectly claims that "it is the decision of the legislature, not the city, 
county or other taxing entities, to allocate such funds to the agency. (Respondent's Brief, 
p. 5) The county's function in calculating the rate at which the taxes shall be levied and 
then actually paying the tax increment revenues to the agency is a ministerial function. 
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The decision that sets this process in motion and causes the county to function in this 
ministerial capacity rests with the municipality, in this instance the City of Rexburg, by 
and through its adoption of an amended Urban Renewal Plan containing a provision for 
revenue allocation pursuant to Idaho Code § 50-2906(1). The City of Rexburg adopted 
Ordinance No. 950, which approved the second amended and restated Urban Renewal 
Plan which contained revenue allocation financing provisions pursuant to Section 50-
2904 and gave notice under Section 50-2906(3) that the modified plan contained a 
"revenue allocation financing provision that will cause tax increment revenues to be 
allocated to the agency for urban renewal." LC. § 50-2906(3) After the effective date of 
the Ordinance, the City of Rexburg transferred a copy of the Ordinance to the county 
(LC. § 50-2907) for purposes of calculating and paying the tax increment revenues to the 
Agency (LC. § 50-2908). Once the City enacts the Ordinance, gives notice and transmits 
a copy to the county, "the revenues allocated to the urban renewal agency pursuant to this 
Chapter shall be paid to the agency by the treasurer of the county in which the revenue 
allocation district is located and shall be deposited by the agency into one or more of such 
special funds." LC. § 50-2908(3) (emphasis supplied) Accordingly, Hart is correct in 
stating that the City allocated the tax increment revenue to the Agency even though in the 
process the county plays a statutorily required ministerial role. 
II Appellant's Constitutional Challenge is Both "Facial" and "As Applied", but 
not a "Hybrid" Challenge. 
Respondent either misconstrues or misunderstands Hart's constitutional 
challenge. The intent of Hart's challenge as both "facial" and "as applied" is expressly 
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stated in Appellant's Brief. (Appellant's Brief, p. 7) For efficiency's sake, Hart did not 
set out the two challenges in two separate sections, but application of the two standards is 
plain from the text of Appellant's brief. Nevertheless, since one of the purposes of a 
reply brief is to meet or correct criticism of the Appellant Brief raised in the Responding 
Brief, the "hybrid" claim will be dealt with immediately below by separate discussion of 
appellant's "facial" and "as applied" challenges: 
(a) Provisions for Increment Tax Revenue Allocation Under the Local 
Development Act are Unconstitutional per se. 
A facial challenge is purely a question of law requiring a demonstration that the 
challenged provisions are unconstitutional in all applications. American Falls Reservoir 
Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dept. of Water Resources, 143 Idaho 862, 870, 154 P.3d 433, 441 
(2007). ( citations omitted) This facial challenge arises from the position of the 
municipality in allocating tax increment revenues to an urban renewal agency under the 
provisions of the Local Economic Development Act. (LC. §§ 50-2904, 2905, 2906, 
2907) In this respect, it should be further noted that the Local Economic Development 
Act is very narrow in its application and is limited to such revenue allocation to urban 
renewal agencies. The constitutional infirmity arises under Article VIII, Section 3 of the 
Idaho Constitution which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
No county, city, board of education or school district or other 
subdivision of the state shall incur any indebtedness, or liability, in 
any manner, or for any purpose, exceeding in that year, the income 
and revenue provided for it for such year, without the assent of 
two-thirds (2/3) of the qualified electors thereof .... 
It has been long settled under Idaho law that revenue bonds issued by a 
municipality secured by a special fund established directly or indirectly by the 
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municipality must be approved by two-thirds of the qualified electors. City of Boise v. 
Frazier, 143 Idaho 1, 137 P.3d 388 (2006); Asson v. City of Burley, 105 Idaho 432, 670 
P.2d 839 (1983), cert. denied, Chemical Bank v. Asson, 469 U.S. 870 (1984); Feil v. City 
of Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 P. 643 (1912). It is settled law in Idaho that the 
special fund doctrine has been rejected. Asson v. City of Burley, supra. Under the special 
fund doctrine, a municipality is held to be constitutionally exempt from debtor liability 
for the reason that the debtor liability created is limited to a special fund. Accordingly, 
revenue allocation bonds derived from tax increment revenues nevertheless constitute 
"indebtedness" or "liability" under Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, 
regardless of the fact that said revenues are attributable to appreciation in value of the tax 
base due to improvements financed by the bond proceeds. Although frequently requested 
to overturn its rejection of the special fund doctrine, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it 
clear through the years that Idaho strictly construes Article VIII, Section· 3 of the Idaho 
Constitution and will not follow other jurisdictions' interpretations. Miller v, City of 
Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843, 845 (1930); Feil, supra. The Idaho Appellate Courts 
have resisted the "outcome oriented" philosophy of other jurisdictions and has strictly 
adhered to the historical construction of this constitutional provision. Boise Development 
Co. v. City of Boise, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531,535 (1914). 
Respondent contends that revenue allocation bonds issued pursuant to the 
provision of the Local Economic Development Act do not constitute "indebtedness" or 
"liability" because of the amendment to Article VIII, Section 1 of the Idaho Constitution 
which provides that urban renewal agencies are exempt from the operation of the vote 
requirements of Article VIII, Section 3. This amendment ratified the finding in this 
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regard of the Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 
94 Idaho 876, 881-882, 499 P.2d 575 (1972). It should be pointed out that whereas under 
said amendment and pursuant to the doctrine of Yick Kong an agency is not a 
"subdivision of state government" it is nevertheless an "arm of state government" for the 
purposes of the Urban Renewal Act. Idaho Code § 50-2006(b )(2). Respondent contends 
that by statute, the Agency, and not the City, is obligated to repay indebtedness incurred 
on the bonds and that the obligation on the bonds is limited to "the monies available in a 
special fund or funds established under Section 50-2908, Idaho Code ... " LC. § 50-
2909(2) Further, Respondent points out that Idaho Code § 50-2910 provides that such 
bonds issued by the agency shall not be a debt or liability or constitute a pledge of the 
city's faith or credit within the meaning of any constitutional or statutory debt limitation 
or restriction. The question arises, however, as to whether this statutory immunization of 
the liability on the bonds issued by the agency dissipates any and all liability on the part 
of the municipality to the agency in the context of the city's allocation of its increment 
tax revenue under the Local Economic Development Act for use by agencies under the 
Urban Renewal Act. In this context, it must be stressed that Article VIII, Section 3 of the 
Idaho Constitution not only prohibits incurring "indebtedness," it prohibits incurring such 
"liability" in any manner or for any purpose. "Liability" has been interpreted by the 
Idaho courts to be much more sweeping and comprehensive than the term 
"indebtedness." Feil, supra, 23 Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649; see also, Boise Development 
Company, supra, 26 Idaho 347, 143 P. 531. The court in Feil stated: 
The framers of our constitution were not content to say that no city 
shall incur any indebtedness "in any manner or for any purpose," 
but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur any 
indebtedness or liability in any many, or for any purpose. It must 
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be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading this language that the 
framers of the constitution meant to cover all kinds and character 
or debts and obligations for which a city may become bound and to 
preclude circuitous and evasive methods of incurring debts and 
obligations to be met by the city or its inhabitants. Feil, supra, 23 
Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649. 
It is clear that a municipality is prohibited from incurring any form of liability for 
any purpose exceeding the yearly income and revenue of the municipality without going 
to the people for a vote. Whereas the liability on the bonds is restricted to the amount in 
the special fund at any one time, there remains a question about the potential liability of 
the municipality to the agency. Even though the agency is not a subdivision of the state 
of Idaho, it is nevertheless a body politic and corporate and is "an arm of the state" (Idaho 
Code§ 50-2006(b)(2)). As such, an agency is a person that has the capacity to contract, 
incur obligations, and sue and be sued. Hart contends that once a municipality 
promulgates an ordinance authorizing increment revenue financing, the municipality 
incurs liability to the agency when the agency issues bonds in reliance on the ordinance. 
Respondent attempts to ignore this "relationship" between the municipality and the 
agency, whereby the agency relies on the increment revenue financing for the term of the 
bonds. 1 The question must be asked whether the municipality has incurred a liability to 
the agency by agreeing to provide the increment tax revenue financing for the period of 
the bonds? Would the agency have a cause of action against the city if the city rescinded 
the revenue financing ordinance and ceased providing tax increment allocated funds to 
the agency? Such a conflict between the municipality and the agency based on this 
obligation/liability is not improbable over a term of years given the results of municipal 
1 In the process of adopting an ordinance containing a revenue allocation provision, calculating the "base 
assessmei1t ro11" and preparing the "budget" wiU automatically involve projected revenues in excess of one 
year. LC. § 50-2903. Hence, any tax increment revenue financing is for a period greater than one year. 
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elections. In the case of the City of Rexburg, such a chauge in city administration is not 
at all improbable given that a bond election for the projects contained in the Urbau 
Renewal Plan had failed shortly before the plan was promulgated. R. pp. 11 I; 117-118. 
Given that no municipality shall incur auy liability in any manner or for auy purpose, 
Hart contends that the mandatory payment provision under LC. § 50-2908(3) for 
increment tax revenue financing by a city to an agency automatically obligates the city 
under this arrangement and thereby creates a liability in the city. The court in Feil 
included in the definition of liability the "state of being bound or obligated in law or 
justice to do, pay, or make good something: legal responsibility .... " Feil, supra, 23 
Idaho at 50, 129 P. at 649. In summary, Hart claims that a municipality creates an 
obligation aud the attendant liability when it provides tax increment funding to an agency 
which relies on that funding for the issuauce of bonds for the designated term.2 Even 
though the bond holders may not be able to reach the city in the event of default, it is 
apparent that the agency would have a right of redress against the city if the city 
prematurely terminated the revenue stream to the agency resulting in defalcation of the 
bonds. 
2 A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the 
promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be 
avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice 
requires . . Smith v. Boise Kenworth Sales, Inc., 102 Idaho 63, 67-68, 625 P.2d 417, 421-22 (1981) (quoting 
restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 90(1) (1973)). See also Day, supra; Mohr v. Shultz, 86 Idaho 531, 540, 
388 P.2d 1002, 1008 (1964); Mitchell v. Bingham Mem'l Hosp., 130 Idaho 420,425, 942 P.2d 544, 549 
(1997). 
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(b) The Revenue Allocation Provision of the City of Rexburg Under 
Ordinance No. 950 Pursuant to the Local Economic Development Act Violates 
Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution, "as Applied". 
Pursuant to Ordinance No. 950 the City of Rexburg made arrangements to 
provide tax increment funding for the Riverside Park Project for at least 24 years. First, 
as stated above, this application of the Local Economic Development Act violates the 
long-standing rule in Idaho against allocation of monies to "special funds." Secondly, as 
described above, the City of Rexburg has clearly obligated itself to the Rexburg Urban 
Renewal Agency to provide said revenue allocation financing to the Agency for the 
projects under the plan. In the event the Agency issues bonds in reliance on said 
allocated 24-year revenue stream, the City will have incurred an obligation and the 
related liability to the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency. To maintain that there is no 
obligation on the part of the City to continue providing said allocated revenue stream 
would place the Agency in the position of possibly committing fraud in promoting said 
bonds based on said revenue stream. In this case, the City's liability was created when it 
knowingly allowed, in fact encouraged, the Agency to sell the bonds to Zion's Bank in 
anticipation that the City would continue to provide the allocated revenue stream to 
service the full terms of the bonds. Such knowing representations clearly create liability. 
(see Footnote 2, supra) The liability is not insubstantial and, as such, violates Article 
VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
In the case of the City of Rexburg and its Urban Renewal Agency, there are no 
federal funds involved, rather, all monies going into the Agency's special fund are tax 
increment revenue funds from the City of Rexburg. The Agency's utilization of tax 
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proceeds allocated by the City pursuant to the Local Economic Development Act goes far 
beyond the relationships described under Idaho Code § 50-2006 and superimposes an 
unconstitutional statutory artifice on the Urban Renewal Act. Claiming that the 
allocation of tax increment funding is different than incurring a debt or liability has been 
disabused by the Idaho Supreme Court in Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 
P.3d 372 (2008) wherein the court stated in this regards as follows: 
There is no logical difference between making an appropriation 
that is specifically prohibited by the Constitution and incurring and 
indebtedness or liability that is specifically prohibited by the 
Constitution. Koch, 145 Idaho at 162-163. 
The fact that the bonds are deemed not to be the debt of the City of Rexburg, does 
not cure the sleight of hand as further explained in O 'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 
Idaho 313, 325-326, 303 P .2d 672, 678-679 (l 956): 
A plan to evade and circumvent the constitutional limitation on the 
creation of debt is not valid merely because the bonds representing 
the debt are declared not to be the obligations of the municipality. 
Hardin v. Owensboro Educational Ass'n, 244 Ky. 390, 50 S.W.2d 
968; State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v. Griffith, 
135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N.E.2d 200; Reynolds v. City of Waterville, 
92 Me. 292, 42 A. 553; City and County of San Francisco v. Boyle, 
195 Cal. 426,233 P. 965. 
Contrary to popular opinion, mere schemes to evade 
law, once their true character is established, are 
impotent for the purpose intended. Courts sweep 
them aside as so much rubbish. Davis v. People, 79 
Colo. 642, 247 P. 801, at page 802. O'Bryant, 78 
Idaho at 325. 
The interworkings of the Local Economic Development Act and the Urban 
Renewal Law as relied on by the City of Rexburg and the Rexburg Urban Renewal 
Agency in this case serve to make O 'Bryant particularly applicable. The analysis must 
begin with the provision of the City's tax increment revenue funding of the Agency and 
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proceed to the resulting liability of the City created thereby in order to arrive at the nature 
of this constitutional violation. 
III. As the Result of Its Utilization of Revenue Allocation (Tax Increment) 
Financing Provided by The City Of Rexburg, The Agency is Rendered the Alter Ego 
of The City of Rexburg and Made Subject to the Provisions of Article VIII, Section 
3 of the Idaho Constitution. 
Respondent submits that on the facts of the present case, the Agency is not 
governed by the court's holding in Boise Development Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., 94 
Idaho 876, 882-83, 499 P.2d, 575, 581-82 (1982). Rather, the present case is governed 
by the court's holdings in Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 162-163, 177 P.3d 
372, 376-377 (2008); and O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 325-326, 303 
P.2d 672-678-679 (1956). 
Whereas the court in Yick Kong was primarily concerned with condemnation 
issues, it did make the holding that the plaintiff, Boise Redevelopment Agency, was not a 
subdivision of the state within the meaning of Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 of the Idaho 
Constitution. This conclusion, the court distinguished O 'Bryant as follows: 
It is apparent that this case is distinguishable from the case of 
O'Bryant v. City of Idaho Falls, 78 Idaho 313, 303 P.2d 672 
(1956). Therein the court held that an ordinance of the city of 
Idaho Falls creating a cooperative with the power to issue bonds 
was unconstitutional because that cooperative was merely an alter 
ego of the city of Idaho Falls. The facts on the record showed that 
the cooperative was merely an attempt by the city to do indirectly 
that which it could not do directly. Herein such facts do not exist. 
YickKong, 94 Idaho at 882. 
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The facts of the present case are inconsistent with the distinction upon which the 
Yick Kong ruling is based. In O 'Bryant, the City of Idaho Falls was using a cooperative 
in order to indirectly construct, operate, and maintain a system for the distribution of gas 
and to pay for the same by the creation of indebtedness and liabilities in excess of its 
revenues for the current year without a vote of the qualified electors. In the present case, 
the City of Rexburg is also indirectly utilizing its resources, namely the tax revenues 
levied by the City and allocated pursuant to the Local Economic Development Act to 
fund the Agency which it formed and the commissioners of which it appointed. Further, 
the City of Rexburg designated, planned and designed all of the projects which the 
Agency will fund utilizing revenue bonds sold in reliance on the representation by the 
City that it will continue for the term of the bonds to provide the allocated tax increment 
funding. The major facial distinction between the present case and Yick Kong is the 
presence of the allocated tax increment funding by the City. Clearly, in this respect the 
facts are much closer to those attendant in O 'Bryant. The Local Economic Development 
Act (I.C. § 50-2901, et seq.) was promulgated in 1988, sixteen years after the Yick Kong 
decision was issued. Further, the allocation to the Agency of future tax revenues levied 
on the allocation district taxpayers serves to fatally weaken the other distinction 
announced by Yick Kong, that is, that the Agency has no powers of taxation. By the 
statutorily authorized Revenue Allocation Scheme, the Agency as the alter ego of the 
City can, in effect, indirectly raise taxes and the city can circumvent the referendum 
requirement. This is clearly statutory sleight of hand. Through the years by degrees, the 
urban renewal agencies have been transformed by application of the tax increment 
revenue financing into instrumentalities of the municipalities, so they could do indirectly 
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what it could not do directly. So it is with the Agency in this case. These constitutionally 
violative facts cannot be obfuscated by statutory artifice or the form of corporate 
organization. In this regard, the court in O 'Bryant stated: 
Courts will pierce the corporate veil and look behind the form of 
organization to determine the true character of an organization and 
will disregard corporate form and consider substance rather than 
form. Packard Clothes, Inc., v. Director of Division of Employment 
Security, 316 Mass. 329, 61 N.E.2d 528; Royal Jewelers Co. of 
Knoxville v. Hake, 185 Tenn. 254, 205 S.W.2d 963; Appeal of 
MacKenzie Auto Equipment Co., 71 Idaho 362, 232 P.2d 130. 
O'Bryant, 78 Idaho at 325. 
The fact that the bonds are held not to be the debt of the City of Rexburg does 
not cure the sleight of hand nor the obligation liability created, as discussed above. 
The statutory artifice established by the Local Economic Development Act for the 
levying and allocation of tax moneys by the City of Rexburg to the Agency far exceeds 
the parameters allowed in Yick Kong and resemble much more closely the fact situation 
in O 'Bryant. Regarding the attempt by the City to do indirectly that which it could not do 
directly, the court in O 'Bryant stated: 
What cannot be done directly by the City of Idaho Falls because of 
constitutional limitations cannot be accomplished indirectly. That 
which the constitution directly prohibits may not be done by 
indirection through a plan or instrumentality attempting to evade 
the constitutional prohibition. Atkinson v. Board of Commissioners, 
18 Idaho 282, 108 P. 1046, 28 L.R.A., N.S., 412; Macallen Co. v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 49 S. Ct. 432, 73 
L. Ed. 874. O'Bryant, 78 Idaho at 325. 
The limitations and prohibitions contained in Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho 
Constitution were discussed by the court at length in Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 
Idaho 32, 129 P. 643, 43 L.R.A., N.S. 1095 (1912), which decision was quoted at length 
in O 'Bryant. As a result of its use of allocated tax revenues, the Agency has either 
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become the alter ego of the City or the City has created a liability to the Agency. 
Respondent cannot deny it both way. It is one or the other and both are unconstitutional. 
In Feil, the court pointed out the many ways any indebtedness or liability may be 
incurred by a municipality and thereby infringe upon the constitutional prohibition. In 
discussing the issuance of bonds for the purchase of waterworks system, where the bonds 
were to be paid out of a special fund provided by revenues from the waterworks system, 
the court stated as follows: 
The courts, to whose decisions we have above referred, have 
indulged in various subtleties and refinements of reasoning to 
show that no debt or indebtedness is incurred where a municipality 
buys certain property, and specifically provides that no liability 
shall be incurred on the part of the city, but that the property shall 
be paid for out of a special fund to be raised from the income and 
revenue from such property. The reasoning, however, of those 
cases utterly fails when applied to our Constitution, for the 
reason that none of those cases deals with the word 'liability,' 
which is used in our Constitution, and which is a much more 
sweeping and comprehensive term than the word 
'indebtedness'; nor are the words 'in any manner or for any 
purpose' given any special attention by the courts in the foregoing 
cases. The framers of our Constitution were not content to say that 
no city shall incur any indebtedness 'in any manner or for any 
purpose,' but they rather preferred to say that no city shall incur 
any indebtedness or liability in any manner, or for any purpose. It 
must be clear to the ordinary mind, on reading this language, 
that the framers of the Constitution meant to cover all kinds 
and character of debts and obligations for which a city may 
become bound, and to preclude circuitous and evasive methods 
of incurring debts and obligations to be met by the city or its 
inhabitants. Feil 23 Idaho at 49-50 (emphasis supplied) 
Any misapprehension that the strict construction of Article VIII, Section 3 is 
"old" law and no longer applicable is disabused by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
. 
Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372 (2008) wherein the court explained 
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the primary purpose and objectives of Article VIII, Section 3 of the Idaho Constitution as 
follows: 
Article VIII, § 3, was designed primarily to protect taxpayers and 
citizens of political subdivisions. Feil v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 23 
Idaho 32, 49-50, 129 P. 643, 648-49 (1912). They are the ones who 
would bear the consequences of the subdivision incurring 
excessive indebtedness. In order to do so, the framers of our 
Constitution granted the qualified electors of the political 
subdivision the constitutional right to vote upon whether the 
subdivision could incur indebtedness or liabilities exceeding its 
income and revenue for the year. It cannot do so "without the 
assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an 
election to be held for that purpose." 
It is not sufficient to simply say that the issue should be left to the 
political process. With some exceptions, Article VIII, § 3, requires 
a two-thirds vote of the qualified electors to approve an 
expenditure, while officials violating the Constitution's spending 
restraints can retain their positions by a simple majority vote. Thus, 
leaving the matter to the political process would, in effect, change 
the required two-thirds vote to a simple majority. Koch 145 Idaho 
at 162. 
The gradual evolution and unconstitutional transmogrification of the Urban 
Renewal Act resulting from the application of the revenue allocation financing powers 
under the Local Economic Development Act have served to render the Agency the alter 
ego of the City of Rexburg. The resulting alter ego status is derived not so much from 
the fact that the City's fathers serve on or appoint the members of the Urban Renewal 
Board, or any single fact, but, rather from the combination of all of the related factors 
working in conjunction. These factors include, but are not limited to, the formation of the 
urban renewal entity by the City, the City's appointment of the Board of Commissioners, 
the City raising the money, the city pledging tax proceeds, the city designating and 
designing the projects the entire enterprise is conceived, funded and directed by the 
City. This evolution has created a situation far removed from the facts situation 
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considered in Yick Kong. The use and encumbering of tax proceeds allocated by the City 
goes far beyond the relationships described under LC. § 50-2006. The claim that the 
City's Ordinance appropriating the allocation of tax revenues is different than incurring a 
debt or liability is disabused by the Idaho Supreme Court in Koch: 
There is no logical difference between making an appropriation 
that is specifically prohibited by the Constitution and incurring an 
indebtedness or liability that is specifically prohibited by the 
Constitution. Koch, 145 Idaho 162-163. 
Even though the Agency is not a subdivision of state government and not an 
entity owned by the City of Rexburg, it is, nevertheless, so entwined, funded and 
controlled by the City of Rexburg that it acts as the City's alter ego. Under these 
circumstances, the fact that the Agency is merely an arm of the government that is not a 
subdivision of state government is rendered irrelevant. Therefore, the Agency's petition 
seeking authorization to issue bonds should be denied as an attempt by the city of 
Rexburg to do indirectly that which it could not directly under Article VIII § 3 of the 
Idaho Constitution. 
IV. The Allocation of Tax Increment Financing by the City of Rexburg to Fund the 
Issuance of Bonds by the Agency Violates Article VIII, Section 4 of the Idaho 
Constitution. 
Article VIII, Section 4 and Article XII, Section 4 are the "credit clauses" under 
the Idaho Constitution and prohibit governmental entities from loaning or pledging their 
credit for the benefit of any corporation for any amount or for any purpose whatsoever. 
Article VIII, Section 4 provides: 
No county, city, town, township, board of education, or school 
district, or other subdivision, shall lend, or pledge the credit or 
faith thereof directly or indirectly, in any manner, to, or in aid of 
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any individual, association, or corporation, for any amount or for 
any purpose whatever, or become responsible for any debt, 
contract or liability of any individual, association or corporation in 
or out of this state. 
Article XII, Section 4 provides: 
No county, town, city, or other municipal corporation by vote of its 
citizens or otherwise, shall ever become a stockholder in any joint 
stock company, corporation or association whatever, or raise 
money for, or make donation or loan of its credit to, or in the aid of 
any such company or association ... 
The issue of whether the municipality was unconstitutionally lending or pledging 
its credit was address in Boise Redevelopment Agency v. Yick Kong Corp., Supra. In that 
case the Court held that those sections relating to "association", "corporation", etc. were 
intended to refer only to "private interests." Id. Idaho at 884, P.2d at 583. This 
conclusion was based on the Court's finding in Engelking v. Investment Board, 93 Idaho 
217, 458 P.2d 213 (1969), where the historical purpose of the constitutional prohibitions 
was explained as preventing favorite status from being given to any private enterprise or 
individual in the application of public funds. It was feared that private interests would 
gain advantages at the expense of the taxpayers. See also, Utah Power & Light Co. v. 
Campbell, 108 Idaho 950, 703 P.2d 714 (1985) (holding that constitutional proscription 
under section 4 of Articles VIII and XII is limited to cases in which public credit is under 
the control of private interests) Even though the Court noted that it was "at least arguable 
that the above provisions do indeed constitute a "donation or loan of credit" and that the 
city of Boise is "raising money for" the plaintiff," the court held that the urban renewal 
agency was not a private entity of the sort intended by the subject constitutional 
provision. 
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However, the advent of the Local Economic Development Act in 1988 allowing 
for the use of revenue allocation financing brings private interests back into the picture. 
The very purpose of the Local Economic Development Act is to utilize the agency as a 
development conduit with the objective being to tum the development property over to 
private interests. (See, Legislative history - statement of purpose of act, supra). The 
purpose of the Act is stated in pertinent part "to encourage taxing district to cooperate in 
the allocation of future tax revenues arising in urban areas .... In order to facilitate long 
term growth of their common tax base, and to encourage private investment within urban 
areas .... " LC. § 50-2901. Hence, the lending and pledging of credit and the raising of 
money is "indirectly" to the benefit of private corporations, associations and interest, with 
the agency being the conduit, even though the initial projects might be public as a 
drawing card to future development. 
The Local Economic Development Act and the use of revenue allocation 
financing did not exist when Yick Kong was decided in 1972. Now with revenue 
allocation of the municipal tax base to the purpose of revenue bonds for the ultimate 
purpose of private development, the entire factual matrix has significantly changed. For 
that reason alone, Yick Kong is no longer applicable with reference to the purpose and the 
mechanism of revenue allocation financing. The fact that the urban renewal agency 
under Yick Kong had no ability to impose taxes on the residents of the city of Boise nor 
encumber any public assets to the advantage of private enterprise is inapposite in 
considering the situation of the revenue allocation financing mechanism, where the assets 
of the municipality are "allocated" (pledged) for an extended period to raise money for 
the agency to eventually attract and benefit private interests and where the municipality 
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forms the Agency and designates the projects. It raises the very specter of the 
inappropriate private interest influence noted in the past where local politicians and 
private interests feathered their respective nests at the taxpayer's expense. 
Accordingly, the fundamental fact situation has changed from Yick Kong with the 
advent of the Local Economic Development Act, the application of which renders that 
case inapplicable. Today, the private enterprises that follow urban renewal take 
advantage of a subsidized situation the same as the railroads of old took advantage of the 
right of way grants and created far more development than their land grants were worth -
whole cities sprang up along the railroad routes. In both cases the public subsidy helped 
bring about development. And in both cases the constitutional restrictions of Article 
VIII, Section 3 and Article XII, Section 4 should apply. A city cannot pledge revenues 
"from any source" whatever without creating an obligation and the attendant liability 
within the constitutional provision limiting indebtedness and liability. Williams v. City of 
Emmett, 51 Idaho 500, 6 P.2d 475 (1931). As discussed above, the concept of"liability" 
is even broader than that of indebtedness in Idaho and is relevant to Mr. Hart's claim that, 
especially now with the advent of revenue allocation financing, the constitutional 
requirement that, before an indebtedness or liability is incurred which exceeds the income 
and revenue provided for it in the current year, it must be submitted to a vote of the 
people and be authorized by two-thirds of the qualified electors. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully submits the decision and judgment of the district court 
herein should be reversed and this matter remanded with the instruction that the Petition 
of the Rexburg Urban Renewal Agency be denied. 
DATED this 9th day of March 2009. 
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC 
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